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solely upon the same erroneous minute en-
try and the record's subsequent silence as 
to a second hearing for the proposition that 
the decision was not made on June 29th.1 
Furthermore, the record does provide a ba-
sis for concluding that leave was in fact 
granted on June 29th. Zions filed its an-
swer to the third party complaint on July 
2nd, only three days after the nunc pro 
tunc order stated that leave was granted. 
It is reasonable to conclude that a party as 
experienced in litigation as Zions would not 
have filed an answer to a "proposed" third 
party complaint before it became effective. 
I would therefore accept the representation 
made by the nunc pro tunc order that leave 
was in fact granted on June 29th. 
Even if there was a question as to wheth-
er leave had been granted on June 29th, 
Zions, by filing an answer that did not 
assert that defense, consented to the filing 
and thereby waived that defense under 
Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. See Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Wilken, 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983) (defenses 
which have not been raised by the answer 
or by proper motion may not be raised in 
opposition to a motion for summary judg-
ment). Since the answer was filed within 
the statutory period, as determined by the 
trial court, the third party complaint was 
timely filed against Zions. Inasmuch as a 
foreclosure action was properly initiated 
against one of the parties in interest, the 
remaining parties could be included under 
the relation back doctrine as recently an-
nounced by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State 
Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 
1990). 
I would therefore uphold Mickelson's me-
chanic's lien as being timely filed. 
HAGEN 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Robert P. HAGEN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 900095-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 23, 1990. 
Defendant was convicted in the Eighth 
District Court, Duchesne County, Dennis L. 
Draney, J., of selling marijuana. Defen-
dant appealed on ground that State failed 
to establish court's jurisdiction over him. 
The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: 
(1) supremacy clause and collateral estop-
pel principles required court to determine, 
pursuant to federal cases, that crime site 
was located within Indian reservation, and 
(2) State's failure to meet its burden of 
showing that defendant was non-Indian re-
quired reversal and discharge of defendant, 
even if State's failure to introduce evidence 
stemmed from good-faith mistake on part 
of prosecution as to who had burden on 
issue. 
Conviction reversed; discharge or-
dered. 
1. The fact that there is no record of a second 
bearing is consistent with and supports the con-
1. Criminal Law *»1132 
Judgment <*=>829(3) 
Deferral of review of criminal convic-
tion on issue of whether crime occurred on 
Indian reservation was not required by rea-
son of case pending before Utah Supreme 
Court, in which prosecution argued that 
location was not in fact an Indian reserva-
tion, where federal courts had construed 
location in other cases to be within reserva-
tion and did not appear to hold open any 
role for state courts on issue; given su-
premacy clause and doctrine of collateral 
estoppel, state courts could not reach con-
trary decision that would have any prac-
tical effect. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 6, cl. 2. 
elusion that there was, in fact, no second hear-
ing. 
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2. Indians *»1 
Before it can be found that defendant 
is Indian under federal law it must appear 
that he has significant percentage of Indi-
an blood and he must be recognized as 
Indian either by federal government or by 
some tribe or society of Indians. 
3. Indians *=>1 
Five-sixteenths Indian blood qualifies 
as "significant percentage" of Indian blood 
under federal test for determining whether 
person is Indian. 
4. Indians *=>1 
Formal enrollment in tribe is not neces-
sary to be recognized as Indian under fed-
eral law. 
5. Indians *»38(5) 
State did not meet its burden, in prose-
cution for sale of drugs that occurred on 
Indian reservation, of showing that defen-
dant was not Indian where only testimony 
presented on issue was defendant's testi-
mony, which was sufficient to meet federal 
test for determining Indian status; even 
assuming that trial court chose to discredit 
defendant's testimony completely, result in 
such case would have been that there was 
no evidence in record on defendant's Indian 
status, which was insufficient to satisfy 
State's burden of proving non-Indian status 
by preponderance of evidence. 
6. Criminal Law *»1166(1), 1187 
State's failure to meet its burden of 
showing that defendant was non-Indian in 
prosecution for drug offense that occurred 
on Indian reservation required reversal of 
conviction and discharge of defendant, even 
if State's failure of proof stemmed from 
good-faith mistake on part of prosecution 
1. Oral argument in this case was heard in Ver-
nal, Utah. This court has frequently sat in loca-
tions other than the court's facility in Salt Lake 
City, as permitted by Utah Code Ann. § 7*-2a-5 
(1987). To date, panels of the court have heard 
argument in both Vernal and Richfield on two 
separate occasions, as well as in Logan, Brig-
ham City, Cedar City, St. George, Fillmore, and 
Manti. The cases heard "on circuit" typically 
arose in the general area, and often one or both 
attorneys reside in the area. Clients who might 
otherwise have to pay for an attorney's time in 
traveling to Salt Lake City can be spared that 
expense. Parties who might not be able to 
as to who had burden on issue of Indian 
status; when reversal results from failure 
of State to prove jurisdiction, further trial 
proceedings are not in order. 
Harry H. Souvall (argued), McRae & De-
Land, Vernal, for defendant and appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, State Atty. Gen., 
David B. Thompson (argued), Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Governmental Affairs, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before GARFF, JACKSON and ORME, 
JJ., sitting in Vernal, Utah K 
ORME, Judge: 
Defendant appeals his conviction on the 
narrow ground that the crime for which he 
was convicted, selling marijuana, was com-
mitted at Myton, Utah, a location within 
the territorial confines of the Uintah and 
Ouray Indian Reservation, and that the 
state failed to establish the court's jurisdic-
tion over him when it failed to prove he is 
not an Indian when confronted with his 
claim that he is. See, e.g., State v. St 
Francis, 151 Vt 384, 563 A.2d 249, 251 
(1989) ("If defendants are 'Indians' and the 
crimes were committed within 'Indian coun-
try/ then Vermont has no jurisdiction over 
defendants."); People v. Luna, 683 P.2d 
862, 365 (Colo.Ct.App.1984) (state lacks jur-
isdiction to prosecute Indian defendants for 
alleged sale and distribution of controlled 
substances in "Indian country"). 
The state concedes on appeal that the 
trial court erred in requiring defendant to 
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, 
come to Salt Lake to hear their cases argued can 
often do so in their own or a nearby communi-
ty. School classes have occasionally attended 
our proceedings. Local sheriffs and court per-
sonnel have invariably been cooperative and, 
with the exception of an occasional glitch with 
unfamiliar recording equipment and one in-
stance of a motel operator mistaking us for 
dog-show judges, our sessions outside Salt Lake 
have come off without incident. 
The court remains firm in its commitment to 
hold sessions throughout the state, as local case-
loads warrant and our own calendaring de-
mands permit. 
STATE v. 
Cite at 802 V2A 745 
that he is in fact an Indian. The state 
properly concedes that the prosecution was 
required to prove jurisdiction, i.e., that de-
fendant was not an Indian, albeit only by a 
preponderance of evidence. See, e.g., State 
v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 469-70 (Utah 
CtApp.1988). 
The state advances two arguments 
against reversal notwithstanding these con-
cessions. First, it suggests that the pre-
cise question of whether Myton is really 
within the confines of the reservation is 
presently before the Utah Supreme Court 
in the case of State v. Perank, No. 860196, 
and that we should defer our consideration 
of this case until the decision in that case is 
issued. Second, it argues that we should 
remand, either to let the trial court reas-
sess the evidence before it with the matters 
of burden of proof and evidentiary stan-
dard correctly in mind or, preferably, to 
give the state the chance to put on addition-
al jurisdictional evidence since its failure to 
put on sufficient evidence resulted from an 
honest mistake on its part, shared by the 
trial court, concerning who had the burden 
of proof on defendant's claimed Indian sta-
tus. 
[1] Both arguments may be summarily 
dealt with. The federal courts, construing 
federal statutes, federal regulations, and 
federal Indian policy, have determined that 
Myton is within the confines of the reserva-
tion. See Ute Indian Tribe v. State of 
Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir.1985) (en 
banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S.Ct. 
596, 93 L.Ed.2d 596 (1986). See also Ute 
Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F.Supp. 
1072, 1188 (D.Utah 1981) (map appended to 
court's opinion depicts Myton as being well 
within both present and historical bound-
aries of Uintah and Ouray Reservation). 
2. Two elements must be satisfied before it can 
be found that [a defendant] is an Indian under 
federal law. Initially, it must appear that he 
has a significant percentage of Indian blood. 
Secondly, the [defendant] must be recognized as 
an Indian either by the federal government or 
by some tribe or society of Indians." Goforth v. 
State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla.Crim.1982). Five-
sixteenths Indian blood clearly qualifies as a 
"significant percentage," the historical debate 
treated in the cases focusing on whether two 
•sixteenths is enough. See, e.g., Sully v. United 
HAGEN Utah 747 
(DuhApp. 1990) 
The Tenth Circuit's decision does not ap-
pear to hold open any role for the state 
courts in refining its holding in Ute Indian 
Tribe. While we have not been acquainted 
with the precise arguments advanced by 
the state in Perank, we are hard-pressed to 
see how, given the Supremacy Clause and 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, our state 
courts could reach a contrary decision that 
would have any practical effect. Seeing no 
possibility of an effective decision in Per-
ank contrary to the result in Ute Indian 
Tribe, we see no reason to await the Per-
ank decision, especially since defendant is 
presently incarcerated. 
12-5] Nor would remand be appropri-
ate. The only testimony concerning wheth-
er defendant is an Indian is that which was 
offered by defendant himself. Defendant 
testified that he has lived on Indian reser-
vations all his life, that he has attended 
reservation schools and been treated at res-
ervation hospitals, that he is a member of 
the Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 
that he had received proceeds from a judg-
ment entered in favor of various bands of 
the Chippewas pursuant to a distribution 
made by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and 
that his ancestry is 5/16ths Indian. Cross-
examination established that defendant 
was not a Ute, that he was not actually 
"enrolled" in any tribe, and that his father 
was not an Indian. Under the applicable 
test,2 there is simply no way this evidence 
could be "weighed" by the trial court to 
come to the conclusion that the state had 
met its burden of proving jurisdiction by 
proving that defendant is not an Indian. 
Indeed, even if the court chose to discredit 
defendant's testimony completely, the re-
sult would be that there is no evidence in 
the record at all concerning defendant's 
States, 195 F. 113 (8th Cir.1912) (one-eighth 
Indian blood is sufficient); Vialpando v. State, 
640 P.2d 77, 80 (Wyo.1982) (one-eighth Indian 
blood not sufficient). The "recognition" re-
quirement is more fluid. See, e.g., St. Cloud v. 
United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 
1988) (factors to consider include government 
provision of "assistance reserved only to Indi-
ans," receiving "benefits of tribal affiliation," 
living on a reservation). Formal enrollment in 
a federally recognized tribe is not required. Id. 
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Indian or non-Indian status. The state sim-
ply could not meet its burden in the ab-
sence of any evidence establishing jurisdic-
tion. 
[6] Nor is the state entitled to a second 
chance to put on evidence addressed to the 
jurisdictional issue. When reversal results 
from the failure of the state to prove juris-
diction, further trial proceedings are not in 
order. On the contrary, the conviction is 
reversed and the defendant is ordered dis-
charged. See, e.g., Sorenson, 758 P.2d at 
470. We have not been shown that any 
exception exists where the failure of proof 
stems from a good-faith mistake on the 
part of the prosecution.1 
Defendant's conviction is reversed and 
he is ordered discharged. 
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Ricky PALMER, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 890583-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 27, 1990. 
Appeal from Third District, Salt Lake; 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge. 
James C. Bradshaw, Joan C. Watt, Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Asso., Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., David B. 
Thompson, Judy Atherton, Asst. Attys. 
Gen., for plaintiff and appellee. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and 
ORME, JJ. 
3. We assume the vast majority of instances 
where the prosecution fails to meet its burden 
to prove jurisdiction results from some honest 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court upon 
appellant's motion to stay issuance of the 
remittitur filed 20 November 1990. 
Appellant seeks to stay the remittitur 
pending disposition of appellant's petition 
for rehearing. Rule 36(a), Utah R.App.P., 
provides that a remittitur shall not issue 
until five days after entry of an order 
disposing of a timely rehearing petition. 
By Order filed 23 November 1990, the 
Court granted appellant an extension of 
time to 19 December 1990 to file the peti-
tion for rehearing. The Order automatical-
ly stayed issuance of the remittitur by vir-
tue of Rule 36(a). Appellant's request to 
stay the remittitur pending disposition of 
the rehearing petition is therefore unneces-
sary. 
Appellant also seeks to stay the remit-
titur pending resolution of a petition for 
writ of certiorari, in the event that appel-
lant files said petition in the Utah Supreme 
Court. Rule 36(b), Utah R.App.P., provides 
that a stay of the remittitur may be grant-
ed pending application for review. Appel-
lant seeks a stay of the remittitur "in the 
event Petitioner's Petition for Rehearing is 
denied, until Appellant's Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court is 
resolved." Appellant's motion to stay the 
remittitur pending disposition of a potential 
petition for certiorari is premature, but 
may be renewed after entry of the order 
disposing of the petition for rehearing. 
Upon receipt of such a motion within the 
five-day period contemplated in Rule 36(a), 
the clerk of the court, consistent with her 
usual practice, will defer remittitur until 
such time as the motion is acted upon by 
the court. 
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY OR-
DERED that the motion is denied. 
•d « Y NUfftf ft SYSTEM} 
mistake on its part concerning its burden and 
how to meet it. 
